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Note 
The findings and policy proposals presented in this report are embedded in an understanding 
of the nature of the jobs challenge in urban areas of Zambia and also draw on examples of 
international good practice.  However, the proposals are not intended to be 
exhaustive. Moreover, these policy ideas and suggestions are presented as a basis for further 
debate.  Further exploration of specific policy proposals and strategies is warranted. The 
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research, through its Flagship Project on More and 
Better Jobs, will undertake some of this further research to offer more detailed policy 
proposals in some priority areas.  These areas will be identified based on the responses to 
this paper from key stakeholders in Zambia.   
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Executive Summary 
 
 
As the 21st century unfolds, the inevitability that a growing share of people will live in cities is 
juxtaposed with deep uncertainty about what the urban future holds – particularly in the 
rapidly urbanizing countries of the global South. Will increasing levels of urbanization 
coincide with an expansion of economic opportunity and productive employment? Will cities 
of the future – as many have in the past – create pathways for social and economic mobility? 
Or will a “pathological” form of urbanization develop, where city growth is not accompanied 
by the creation of productive jobs with appropriate remuneration, basic social protections, 
and opportunities for upward mobility? 
 
Zambia finds itself at an important juncture in determining its urban future. The country’s 
policymakers must actively choose to promote its cities as centers of job creation and 
opportunity. Over the last 15 years, the decades of economic stagnation that marked the late 
20th century have given way to high rates of sustained economic growth. Despite Zambia’s 
current economic downturn – driven by a decline in global copper prices and energy 
shortages – the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is still projected to grow 3 percent in 
2016, an indication that the drivers of its growth lie beyond the copper industry alone. 
 
With the process of structural transformation accelerating, Zambia’s cities are assuming 
greater importance in ensuring its people have access to productive employment. The 
country is witnessing a dramatic labor market shift, as its workforce moves out of agriculture 
and into services and industry; between 2008 and 2014, the share of Zambian workers 
employed in agriculture fell steeply, from 71.4 percent to 48.9 percent. City populations are 
expanding at an average rate of nearly 4 percent per year. Projections suggest that Zambia 
must create 1.2 million net new urban jobs by 2025 and 2.8 million by 2035. 
 
Despite the country’s robust economic growth, evidence shows that its urban labor markets 
are not creating enough of the kinds of jobs that will propel inclusive growth and maximize 
Zambia’s “demographic dividend.” Real wages declined between 2012 and 2014 in both 
Lusaka and the Copperbelt – the country’s two heavily urbanized provinces where two-thirds 
of its city-dwelling population lives. In Lusaka, urban workers earned nearly 17 percent less in 
real terms in 2014 than in 2012. In both Lusaka and the Copperbelt, the number of unpaid 
family workers is still growing faster in absolute terms than the number of paid workers. 
Most urban employment growth is taking place in low-productivity informal services. And 
several of the sectors where urban jobs are concentrated and growing are in fact declining in 
terms of their contribution to Zambia’s overall GDP – an early warning that productivity may 
not be rising fast enough to sustain continued job growth in the long run. These data predate 
the economic slowdown, which is likely to exacerbate the trends. 
 
There are some positive notes, too: a declining rate of urban unemployment; a booming 
construction sector that employed 128 percent more workers in 2014 than in 2008; a 
hospitality sector that expanded formal employment by 63 percent in the same period. But 
these bright spots cannot outshine the warning signs mentioned above, which point to a 
severe lack of productive jobs in urban areas, outside the small, and shrinking, formal sector, 
which employs just over a quarter of urban Zambians. 
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Nevertheless, Zambia’s current policy framework appears based on the assumption that its 
rural areas are languishing while its cities are thriving. Job creation policies stress rural 
development. The Revised Sixth National Development Plan (2013-16), for example, “focuses 
on public capital investments that have a bias to rural development.” The country’s 
manufacturing policy is based on a vision of “rural industrialization.”  
 
This report calls on the Zambian government to make job-rich urbanization a top policy 
priority. Urban economies are predisposed to create quality jobs because of their internal 
and external economies of scale, but the positive relationship between urbanization and 
quality employment creation is not inevitable. It depends on the extent to which 
governments strengthen the economic base of cities and create the spaces and enabling 
environments for productive economic activities.  
 
To manage Zambian cities toward job-rich urbanization, this report proposes three guiding 
principles for urban governance: 
 
1. Zambia must focus on managing existing urban systems, rather than trying to create 
them anew. This means taking stock of existing urban systems – such as informal 
settlements and informal systems for trading and selling goods and services – and 
determining the ways in which the state can make those systems operate better: 
more efficiently, more safely, and with better outcomes for the involved stakeholders.   
 
2. Zambian cities must enable businesses – particularly micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) – to expand, increase productivity, and (eventually) enter the 
formal economy. Current policies in Zambia emphasize the formation and growth of 
MSMEs in order to spur job creation – particularly for youth. But urban firms, and 
especially the small, informal enterprises that are formed through policies that 
promote entrepreneurship and microfinance, face a built environment and urban 
policy framework that is not conducive to their growth and prosperity.  
 
3. Urban planning and infrastructure investment must focus on strengthening the links 
among firms and between firms and consumers. Zambia’s investments in cities and 
beyond must advance the goal of strengthening the links within local, provincial, 
national and international supply chains. Rail and road infrastructure projects must 
take into account the needs of micro, small and medium enterprises – especially 
those in labor-intensive sectors like agro-processing. Zambian businesses require a 
broader enabling environment that can help them connect with one another and with 
larger foreign enterprises. 
 
The report goes on to make specific policy recommendations. Rather than an exhaustive list 
of all the reforms that must be introduced, these proposals represent concrete examples of 
how an approach based on the three guiding principles could manifest in specific policies, 
taking into account Zambia’s particular challenges and opportunities: 
 
 Bolster efforts to recognize and upgrade informal settlements. Informal settlements 
are not only the place of residence for over 70 percent of Zambia’s urban residents; 
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they are also centers of economic activity and employment – representing a physical 
home for the vast informal urban economy. Currently, the efficiency and productivity 
of businesses operating in informal settlements is stifled by several factors: poor 
connectivity to markets; lack of willingness to invest in better facilities and 
technology due to insecurity of tenure; and limited scale of operations owing to lack 
of space. If Zambian policymakers hope that MSMEs – led by a government emphasis 
on entrepreneurship – can sustain job creation, they must address the built 
environment issues faced by such businesses. 
 
 Extend cluster-based industrial policy to urban areas and upgrade urban markets. The 
cluster approach to industrialization, which the Zambian government is currently 
pursuing in rural areas, is well suited to an urban economy, as agglomeration effects 
facilitate clustering. There is significant scope for promoting manufacturing activities 
in urban Zambia to improve employment outcomes in cities. The urban trading sector 
would also benefit from a more proactive policy approach. 
 
 Improve intra- and intercity connectivity and leverage new infrastructure investments 
to stimulate growth of labor-intensive sectors. Connectivity – both within the city and 
between different centers of production – is one of the keys to leveraging the 
agglomeration effects of urban economies to create more and better jobs. Effective 
public transportation networks can facilitate better labor market matching and help 
small businesses that rely on public transit to move their goods to market. Moreover, 
new investments in national road and rail infrastructure can be harnessed to support 
the growth of labor-intensive sectors and MSMEs. 
 
 Revitalize and diversify the Copperbelt to create a more dynamic, job-creating urban 
region. The Copperbelt is undoubtedly one of the most important urban regions of 
Zambia, but today its economic fortunes are imperiled, largely because of its 
overdependence on the sector that has granted it prosperity – copper mining. The 
current moment provides an opportunity. Building on the Copperbelt’s existing 
assets, the right mix of interventions by Zambian policymakers can reverse the 
province’s downturn and at the same time create a vibrant urban labor market 
through diversifying its economic output. 
 
 
Given the current situation – with eroding urban incomes, a decline in the share of formal 
jobs in non-farm sectors, and large increases in urban unpaid family workers – it is clear that 
urban employment needs renewed attention among Zambian policymakers. As leaders in the 
Ministry of Local Government and Housing and beyond consider various ways of improving 
the quality of urbanization in Zambia, they must make “job-rich” the lens through which each 
proposed initiative is evaluated. 
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Introduction 
 
As the 21st century and its attendant challenges and opportunities unfold around the world, it 
is plainly evident that urbanization will rank among the most defining trends for decades to 
come. The year 2008 witnessed a symbolic milestone, when the percentage of the global 
population living in cities crossed 50 percent.1  
 
Urbanization today is most rapid in the relatively less developed countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia, where imbricated processes of economic, social and environmental 
transformation are pushing and pulling people into urban lives and livelihoods. By 2050, the 
world’s urban population is expected to increase by more than two thirds, with nearly 90 
percent of the growth taking place in the cities of Africa and Asia.2 The unbridled growth of 
cities in the global South has spawned two competing and reductive narratives – one that 
celebrates cities as the “engines of growth” and another that laments urbanization as the 
harbinger of slums, public health crises, and social unrest. Zambia has witnessed the duel 
between these two versions of the urbanization story.3 
 
The truth is that cities are neither inherently good nor inherently bad. Their ability to 
generate economic, social and cultural opportunities depends on how well they are 
managed, which is why governments, the private sector and civil society are paying 
increasing attention to promoting “good urbanization.” Rather than viewing urbanization as 
simply a spatial consequence of economic growth, policymakers now realize that they must 
treat cities as a key site of policymaking in order to achieve the broader aims of sustainable 
development and inclusive growth. 
 
Leaders in Zambia find themselves at this juncture. The Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing is currently developing a National Urbanization Policy that will facilitate planning and 
management of urbanization countrywide. This report is an input to their process of outlining 
a proactive vision for Zambia’s cities – focusing in particular on the need to generate job-rich 
growth in urban areas. It forms one part of a broader effort by the Zambia Institute for Policy 
Analysis and Research (ZIPAR) and its partners to propose policy strategies for stimulating the 
creation of more and better employment opportunities in the country (see Box 1). 
                                                 
1
 UNFPA. 2007. State of the world population 2007: Unleashing the potential of urban growth. Accessed April 
20, 2016.  https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/695_filename_sowp2007_eng.pdf  
2
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2014. World Urbanization Prospects 2014. 
Accessed April 20, 2016, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf  
3 
The Zambian Economist, a well-known blog primarily focused on the Zambian economy, said in 2010 that 
“cities are clearly engines of growth.” Meanwhile, the National Housing Sector Policy 2016 (forthcoming) points 
to rapid urbanization as the culprit for the growth of informal settlements, congestion, higher health risks, 
environmental degradation and urban delinquency. 
BOX 1. ZIPAR Flagship: More and Better Jobs  
This report is part of an ongoing research program led by the Zambia Institute for Policy 
Research and Analysis. ZIPAR's flagship project, More and Better Jobs, was launched on June 
25, 2015. This flagship project seeks to develop a better understanding of the long-term and 
acute job challenges in Zambia, and find policy responses to protect and create more and 
better jobs. 
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Defining Good Urbanization: Placing Zambia in a global context 
 
But what does “good urbanization” mean?  
 
Much of the urban agenda has revolved around ensuring better delivery of municipal services 
like housing, transportation, water, sewerage, and waste collection. In the new United 
Nations Sustainable Development Agenda, the goal focused on cities emphasizes “access to 
safe and affordable housing,” “upgrading slum settlements,” and “investment in public 
transport.”4 
 
These are critical issues in many cities around the world, particularly in the global South. In 
Zambia, over half of urban residents live in slums,5 45.6 percent do not have electricity, and 
16.4 percent lack access to a safe water source.6  
 
Yet one of the most important roles that cities can play in economic development – creating 
more and better jobs – seems to have become secondary in the global urban agenda, even in 
cases where there is a clear nexus between urban services and job creation. Policymakers 
who plan and manage cities have largely left the critical task of creating urban employment 
to national policy frameworks. Good jobs have been neglected in definitions of good 
urbanization. Urban livelihoods have become secondary to urban services. 
 
Policies around informal settlements, for example, demonstrate the consequence of ignoring 
the livelihood dimension of urban planning. Governments throughout the global South, in 
order to “eradicate” slums, have pursued policies that have proven destructive to urban 
employment networks – relocating informal settlements to city peripheries, as if the only 
goal of urban life is to have a legal residence.7  
 
Most importantly, policymakers have all but ignored one of the most worrying patterns of 
modern urbanization: the lack of quality employment in the cities of the newly urbanizing 
regions of the world.   
 
Countries in Europe and North America that experienced urbanization in the 19th and 20th 
century saw a strong link between the growth of cities and the growth of incomes – largely 
because urbanization was driven by industrialization, which creates formal economy jobs that 
are more productive and better paying than agricultural work or informal employment. But 
the connection between urbanization, industrialization, and the growth of formal 
employment is far more tenuous in the developing world.8 Cities throughout the newly 
urbanizing global South, rather than party to a large-scale expansion of formal, productive 
                                                 
4
 Sustainable Development Goals. Goal 11: Sustainable cities and communities. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/goal-11.html  
5
 United Nations Resettlement Program. Accessed via Zambia Open Data Portal on April 20, 2016. 
http://zambia.opendataforafrica.org/  
6
 Living Conditions and Monitoring Survey, 2010. Accessed April 20, 2016.  
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/report/Lcms/2006-2010%20LCMS%20Report%20Final%20Output.pdf  
7
 Susan Parnell and Sophie Oldfield (Editors).2014. The Routledge Handbook on the Cities of the Global South 
(Pages 92-95) Accessed April 20, 2016. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2427.12234/abstract  
8
 OECD. 2015. The Metropolitan Century: Understanding Urbanization and its Consequences. Accessed April 20, 
2016. http://www.delog.org/cms/upload/pdf-ug/OECD_The_Metropolitan_Century.pdf  
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employment in manufacturing, are instead witnessing the ballooning of informal 
employment in low-value-added services. Unemployment may be low, but 
underemployment and low-productivity employment are high.9,10  
 
Countries like Zambia stake their economic futures on realizing a “demographic dividend,” as 
the size of the working-age population grows in proportion to the total population. But as the 
Zambian Ministry of Finance has itself noted, “the demographic dividend is neither automatic 
nor guaranteed; countries must ensure that the larger labor force is well educated, skilled, 
healthy, and economically engaged.”11 A different pattern of urbanization – in Zambia and 
elsewhere – is required to attain that goal.  
 
This report will demonstrate that despite its unique history and early period of 
industrialization, Zambia is confronting challenges similar to those faced throughout the 
global South, as the country witnesses rapid urbanization without accompanying rapid 
expansion of productive urban employment. It will argue that Zambia’s policymakers must 
make urban jobs central to their vision for “good urbanization” in the country. And it will 
chart policy directions toward realizing the goal of creating more and better jobs in Zambia’s 
cities. 
 
 
The Relationship Between Urbanization and Job Creation 
 
Existing literature on the relationship between urbanization and job creation contains two 
important messages. The first is that certain unique features of cities make them ripe ground 
for job creation. The second is a caveat: The relationship between urbanization and job 
creation – particularly productive, formal employment – is varied and tenuous; not all forms 
and patterns of urbanization are created equal. 
 
Cities enable both internal and external economies of scale. Internal economies of scale refer 
to an urban firm’s ability to produce at relatively larger scale than a rural firm, since an urban 
market is thicker – that is, it has more buyers and sellers – than a non-urban market. 
Enterprises can produce more, at cheaper prices, enabling them to grow faster, add 
employees, and make productivity-enhancing investments.12  
 
                                                 
9
 Ronan Paddison and Tom Hutton. 2015. Cities and Economic Change: Restructuring and Dislocation in the 
Global Metropolis. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
https://books.google.co.in/books?id=Bd7SAwAAQBAJ&dq=Cities+and+Economic+Change:+Restructuring+and+
Dislocation+in+the+Global+Metropolis  
10
 A related phenomenon is what Dani Rodrik calls “premature deindustrialization” (NBER Working Paper Series, 
Premature Deindustrialization, Dani Rodrik). Manufacturing sectors in many developing countries are peaking 
long before reaching the heights that were attained in Europe, North America, or East Asia in terms of share of 
employment or contribution to GDP. In Zambia, the share of employment in manufacturing peaked in the 
1980s, and the manufacturing sector’s contribution to GDP has also been in decline.  
11
 Harnessing the Demographic Dividend: The Future We Want for Zambia, May 2015. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/event-pdf/icpd2014_key_issues_paper_en.pdf  
12
 Hoover, Edgard M. 1975. An Introduction to Regional Economics, 2nd edition. Accessed on April 20, 2016.  
http://132.248.45.5/cedrus/descargas/hoover.pdf  
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External economies of scale – also known as agglomeration effects – refer to the benefits a 
firm receives through proximity to other firms. Beneficial agglomeration effects include 
“labor pooling” – or a thicker labor market with a diversity of skilled workers; lower input 
costs due to proximity of firms producing inputs and intermediate goods; the “knowledge 
spillover” that comes from more interaction with related firms; and the lower costs of 
transportation and other services due to greater density and scale of activity.13 
 
These effects enable firms to grow, be more productive, and improve product quality. In 
turn, they facilitate the creation of employment. But there are other benefits for workers in 
urban economies, too. With a greater number of job opportunities and firms, the chances of 
a quality match between workers’ skills and firms’ needs are greater – translating into higher 
compensation. The greater degree of specialization in urban economies also encourages 
workers to develop particular skills. And urban labor markets facilitate greater employment 
security; when a worker loses his/her job, there are relatively more alternative job options 
available.  
 
But, as scholar Ivan Turok has contended, one of the consistent errors of policy dialogue 
around cities is that “the connection between urbanization and economic growth is 
sometimes portrayed as automatic and inevitable, like some kind of universal law governing a 
single, simple process.”14 The same is true when considering the relationship between 
urbanization and employment creation: urbanization is treated as a one-to-one proxy for 
expanding economic opportunity. Recent research increasingly demonstrates that the 
phenomenon of urbanization is highly diverse in its forms and patterns, and that different 
kinds of urbanization influence growth and jobs in different ways.15 
 
If “good urbanization” is the kind accompanied by industrialization, economic growth and job 
creation, at the other end of the spectrum lies “pathological urbanization” – as several 
scholars have termed it. As already discussed, most of the developed economies of today 
experienced the former, while the relationship between urbanization, economic growth and 
job creation is more tenuous in emerging and developing economies.  
 
Some literature points to the region of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to illustrate “pathological 
urbanization” – or urbanization without growth.16 In SSA, the average country’s urban 
population grew by 5.2 percent per year between 1970 and 1995, while GDP per capita was 
falling at an annual rate of 0.66 percent.17 Kenya, for example, saw its urbanization rate jump 
                                                 
13
 Gilles Duranton. 2009. Urbanization and Growth - Chapter 3: Are Cities Engines of Growth and Prosperity for 
Developing Countries?. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-
1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Vol1_Urbanization_Growth.pdf  
14
 Ivan Turok. 2014. Linking Urbanization and Development in Africa’s economic revival. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ivan_Turok/publication/262802198_Linking_urbanisation_and_develop
ment_in_Africa's_economic_revival/links/00b49538e29f888904000000.pdf?origin=publication_list  
15
 OECD. 2015. The Metropolitan Century: Understanding Urbanization and its Consequences. Accessed April 
20, 2016. http://www.delog.org/cms/upload/pdf-ug/OECD_The_Metropolitan_Century.pdf  
16
 Patricia Clarke Amnez and Robert M Buckley. 2009. Urbanization and Growth- Chapter 1: Urbanization and 
Growth: Setting the context. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
17
 Marianne Fay. 2000. Urbanization without growth: A not so Un-common Phenomenon. Accessed April 20, 
2016. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23549223_Urbanization_without_Growth_A_Not-So-
Uncommon_Phenomenon  
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from 7 percent to 20 percent between 1960 and 2003, while its GDP per capita rose only 
from US$ 1,179 to US$ 1,218 (in constant prices) over the same period.18 While rates of GDP 
growth on the African continent have picked up over the last decade, positive trends have 
been driven largely by the global demand for commodities – fueling extractive industries that 
create few jobs. The persistent rates of urban informality and slow pace of industrialization 
suggest that most Sub-Saharan African countries have yet to address the roots of 
“pathological urbanization.” With four out of every 10 people living in cities, average income 
levels in SSA are just 28 percent and 56 percent of what they were in East Asia & the Pacific 
and the Middle East & North Africa, respectively, when those regions reached the same rate 
of urbanization.19   
 
This “urbanization of people without capital,” as some observers have termed it, is motivated 
by “push” rather than “pull” factors – rural distress and high rates of natural population 
increase in cities, as opposed to industrialization and urban job growth.20 The negative 
consequences of such an urbanization pattern are mutually reinforcing: the lack of formal, 
productive employment means that the vast majority of people wind up in the informal 
economy, with poor working conditions and low wages. Governing institutions lack tax 
revenue, therefore, to expand urban services like housing and transportation. With 
insufficient public investments, widespread urban problems arise – such as congestion and 
poor sanitation and living conditions – constricting the positives of agglomeration and scale 
and further incapacitating the growth of a more productive urban economy.21 
 
The management of urbanization – the extent to which governments strengthen the 
economic base of cities and generate a range of employment opportunities by creating the 
spaces and enabling environments for productive economic activities – determines whether 
cities can avoid or emerge from this vicious cycle. 
 
 
Stock-Taking: Zambia’s Urban Jobs Challenge 
 
Zambia is confronting many of the same challenges as other countries in the global South and 
Sub-Saharan Africa when it comes to rapid urbanization, the exodus of workers from 
agriculture, and the need to stimulate the creation of high-quality jobs in diversified urban 
labor markets. Nevertheless, the country has also witnessed a unique history of urbanization, 
and its current urban centers host different types of economies and labor markets. These 
characteristics demand a multi-pronged approach to tackling the challenge of urban job 
                                                 
18
 Michael Spence, Patricia Annez, Robert Buckley. 2009. Urbanization and Growth. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-
1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Vol1_Urbanization_Growth.pdf  
19
 World Bank. 2016. Africa Pulse: April 2016, Volume 13. Accessed on April 20, 2016. http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2016/04/10/090224b08427c98d/2_0/Rende
red/PDF/Africa0s0pulse00April020160.pdf  
20
 Remi Jedwab, Luc Christiaensen, Marina Gindelsky. 2015. Demography, urbanization and development: Rural 
push, urban pull and urban push? Accessed April 20, 2016.  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119015000601  
21
 Michael Spence, Patricia Annez, Robert Buckley. 2009. Urbanization and Growth. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-
1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Vol1_Urbanization_Growth.pdf  
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creation. First, it is critical to take stock of the trends – where Zambia’s cities have been, 
where they are today, and what the future may hold. 
 
 
Urbanization in Zambia: an overview 
 
At the time of its independence in 1964, Zambia was among the most urbanized countries in 
Africa. As urban centers around the country’s rich copper mines continued to swell, the 
percentage of Zambians living in cities climbed to nearly 40 percent by the 1980s.22 But 
declining fortunes in the copper industry combined with hard-nosed structural adjustment 
policies, which involved large-scale retrenchments of public sector workers, plus the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic that lowered life expectancy in cities, led to de-urbanization in Zambia 
through the 1990s. De-urbanization arose from increasing urban mortality rates and 
declining urban fertility rates, but also from out-migration from urban areas.23 While most of 
Zambia’s African peers have seen a steady, linear rise in their rates of urbanization over the 
last half-century, the percentage of Zambians living in cities has only recently recovered to its 
1980 level (see Figure 1). 
 
The first 15 years of the 21st century saw relatively stable and sustained growth of Zambia’s 
urban population – mirroring the patterns observed in other developing countries – as cities 
in the country finally recovered from the economic downturn faced in previous decades. 
Zambia’s urban population has grown at an annual rate of around 4 percent since 2000 – 
                                                 
22
 World Development Indicators, World Bank Accessed April 20, 2016. http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators 
23
 Deborah Potts. 2005. Counter-urbanisation on Zambian Copperbelt? Interpretations and Implications. 
Accessed on Aril 20, 2016. http://usj.sagepub.com/content/42/4/583.short  
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nearly double the population growth rate of rural Zambia.24 This matches the average urban 
growth rate of Sub-Saharan Africa and comparator countries in the region (see Figure 2), 
suggesting that the challenges Zambia faces in managing urbanization in this century will not 
be dissimilar to those confronted by other countries at similar stages of economic 
development. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
Zambia’s previous experience with de-urbanization raises the possibility that steady urban 
population growth could be interrupted by severe economic shocks in the future as well. 
Zambia in fact finds itself currently in a moment of economic turmoil. Over the past two 
years, the country has been seriously impacted by declining copper prices, as demand for 
commodities has fallen across the world and particularly in China. With metal exports 
accounting for more than 70 percent of all of Zambia’s exports, the economy is highly 
exposed to these kinds of fluctuations.25 Lower revenues obtained from the mining sector are 
compounded by an energy crisis, as sustained drought has severely limited the generation 
capacity of hydropower – on which Zambia is heavily dependent. The economic slump has 
brought massive depreciation of the Kwacha – which lost 51 percent of its value against the 
U.S. dollar in 2015, the largest depreciation among the 155 currencies regularly monitored by 
global investors.26 Total Government debt was projected to reach 56 percent of GDP by the 
end of 2015.27 All these factors have led to a slowdown of the Zambian economy from an 
                                                 
24
 United Nations Statistics Division. Country Profile: Zambia. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=ZAMBIA  
25
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 2013. Observatory of Economic Complexity, What does Zambia 
export? Accessed on April 19, 2016, 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/zmb/all/show/2013/ 
26
 Mail and Guardian Africa. Published on November 6, 2015. Zambia debt soaring as kwacha loses 51% of its 
value against dollar, World Bank says. Accessed on April 20, 2016. http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-11-06-
zambia-debt-ratio-soaring-as-currency-plunges-world-bank-says  
27
 Matthew Hill, 6 November 2015. “Zambia Debt Ratio Soaring as Currency Plunges, World Bank Says.” 
Bloomberg News. Accessed on April 20, 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-06/zambia-
debt-ratio-soaring-as-currency-plunges-world-bank-says  
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average annual growth rate of 7 percent between 2010 and 2014 to about 3 percent in 
2015.28 
 
Despite the magnitude of Zambia’s current slowdown, it is unlikely to trigger the sort of de-
urbanization experienced in earlier decades. For one, the economy has not slid into 
recession, and projections suggest that GDP will still grow at 3 percent in 2016.29 For the sake 
of comparison, the Zambian economy contracted – that is, its growth rate was negative – in 
six of the ten years between 1975 and 1985.30 Moreover, the biggest reasons behind de-
urbanization at that time were the HIV/AIDS crisis and the massive retrenchment of public 
sector workers, neither of which are grave concerns today. Finally, the return to rural areas 
witnessed in the earlier period is unlikely to recur given that the agricultural sector is also 
negatively impacted by the drought that has brought about the current energy crisis; once 
Zambia sees relief from the ongoing drought, its energy shortage will also be mitigated, 
alleviating economic woes in cities. 
  
Because the authors of this report believe that Zambia’s future trajectory of urbanization will 
not be substantially impacted by the current economic situation, its focus remains long-term. 
At the same time, the report’s policy framework and recommendations are highly practical 
and not divorced of the current context; in other words, Zambian policymakers do not need 
to wait for better economic fortunes to react to the trends identified in this report or 
implement the ideas presented here. 
 
Lusaka will continue to dominate the urban landscape 
 
In most developing countries, primary cities – those with the largest populations and most 
dominant economies – are beginning to witness a plateauing of population growth. Various 
factors contribute to this phenomenon, but one of the most important is the rising barriers 
to entry for rural-urban migrants. As large cities grow, the saturation of the labor market 
enhances competition among workers and rising population density drives up the cost of 
housing and other basic needs. In other words, it becomes more difficult for unskilled 
migrants to claim space or jobs in the city.31  
 
In Zambia, the story is different (see Figure 3). Government projections32 show that Lusaka 
will continue to dominate the urban landscape, and that its population growth will outpace 
                                                 
28
The World Bank. Country Overview: Zambia. Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/overview  
29
 ibid.  
30
World Development Indicators, World Bank Accessed April 20, 2016.  
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
31
 See, for example: Amitabh Kundu and Debolina Kundu. 2011. India's 'urban' legend. Business Standard. 
Accessed on April 24, 2016. http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/amitabh-kundu-debolina-
kundu-india-s-urban-legend-111091500114_1.html  
32
 The 2011-2035 population projections were arrived at using cohort component models developed for rural 
and urban areas of Zambia and all the ten provinces. The 2010 Census de jure count provided the 'base 
population' figures, disaggregated by age and sex. Corrections relating to undercounting of children in the 
census were made by making some fertility and mortality rate assumptions. The census figures were backdated 
from October 16, 2010 to mid-year July 1, 2010. This ensured that all estimations of projected populations 
referred to mid-year estimates, keeping in line with standard population projections. For details see: 
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the national rate of urban growth until at least 2030 (see Figure 4). This is due to the slower 
rate of growth in Zambia’s secondary cities, a tier of smaller, older urban centers that lie 
mostly in the Copperbelt region. The Zambian government projects that these cities will host 
a declining share of the country’s total urban population (see Table 1) – due, perhaps, to the 
decline in the copper industry’s strength following weak global demand. Beyond 2030, 
projections suggest that the share of the urban population living in Lusaka will finally begin to 
taper – as today’s tertiary cities, like Solwezi in the North-Western Province and Kasama in 
the Northern Province, become more dominant population centers. 
 
This trend is an important one for Zambian policymakers to consider. Given that employment 
outcomes in Lusaka are not demonstrably better than in the country as a whole (see 
Employment outcomes in urban Zambia), its growing share of the urban population is not 
likely driven by the strength of its labor market, but rather the lack of better options for rural-
urban migrants. The trend spells growing pressure on Lusaka to produce jobs for an 
expanding urban workforce. If Lusaka is unable to meet the demand, the result would be 
oversaturation of its labor market, which would place downward pressure on wages and 
working conditions. The report will later discuss what might be done to revive the labor 
markets of secondary cities in the Copperbelt in order to relieve some of the pressure on 
Lusaka to generate productive urban jobs (see Revitalize and diversify the Copperbelt to 
create a more dynamic, job-creating urban region). These two urban regions drive the bulk of 
the report’s analysis, as they host over two-thirds of the country’s urban population.33 
  
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/report/Census/2010/National/Zambia%20Census%20Projection%202011%20-
%202035.pdf. 
 
33
 Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Population and Housing Census (2011-2035). Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
http://zambia.opendataforafrica.org/ZMPHC2015/population-and-housing-census-of-zambia-2011-2035  
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Source: Population and Housing Census (2011-2035) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
City 
Projected Annual Growth Rate 
(2015-35) 
Chingola 2.4% 
Kabwe 1.1% 
Kitwe 3.2% 
Livingstone 2.8% 
Lusaka 3.5% 
Ndola 1.9% 
 
Source: Population and Housing Census (2011-2035)34 
 
 
High density without effective land use 
 
Population density plays an important role in facilitating the job-creating characteristics of 
cities by amplifying the agglomeration effects of urban economies. But the Zambian case 
demonstrates why high density alone is not enough to create an efficient urban economy.   
 
Lusaka features among the more densely populated cities in Africa, and while Zambia’s 
largest secondary cities – Kitwe and Ndola – have far fewer people per square kilometer, they 
are still more densely populated than the primary cities of Ghana and Zimbabwe – Accra and 
Harare, respectively (see Figure 5). 
 
                                                 
34
 The analysis is based on district-level data. For the cities listed, the entire district contains built-up urban area.   
Figure 4. Projected Share of Urban Population in Lusaka (%) 
32%
34%
36%
38%
40%
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Table 1. Projected Average Annual Population Growth (2015-2035) 
Zambia’s Key Urban Centers 
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Source: Demographia World Urban Areas 
 
However, population density does not imply efficient use of urban land. As of the year 2000, 
nearly 50 percent of Lusaka’s land remained vacant.35 The density was largely concentrated 
in informal settlements – which take up only 20 percent of Lusaka’s land and house 70 
percent of its residents.36 Density in the city was highly uneven at the time, suggesting that 
some areas of the city were too sprawling to enjoy the economic benefits of agglomeration,37 
and other parts of the city so congested as to see the benefits of density circumscribed.  
 
At the same point in time, a minimal amount of Lusaka’s land was being used for functions 
that are associated with job creation in the formal economy – such as manufacturing, 
financial services, or information technology. Less than 2 percent of the city’s land was being 
utilized for industrial activities, and the central business district occupied just 0.6 percent.38 
In a low-rise city, these spatial characteristics are strongly correlated with high levels of 
informality in the urban labor market. These land use patterns indicate that most of Lusaka’s 
workers in the year 2000 were employed in the informal economy – home-based workers 
and/or working inside informal settlements – a reality that persists today.39 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Danny Simatele, Munacinga Simatele. 2009. The Evolution and Dynamics of Urban Poverty in Zambia. 
Accessed April 20, 2016. 
https://www.academia.edu/2122745/The_Evolution_and_Dynamics_of_Urban_Poverty_in_Zambia  
36
 The World Bank. 2002. Country Assessment Report: Zambia. Accessed April 20, 2016.  
http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/upgrading/case-examples/overview-africa/country-
assessments/reports/Zambia-report.html  
37
 For evidence of the negative impact of urban sprawl on economic outcomes, see Belal N. Fallah, Mark D. 
Partridge, and M. Rose Olfert. 2009. Urban Sprawl and Productivity. Accessed April 24, 2016. 
https://www.academia.edu/2894906/Urban_Sprawl_and_Productivity  
38
 Danny Simatele, Munacinga Simatele. 2009. The Evolution and Dynamics of Urban Poverty in Zambia. 
Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
https://www.academia.edu/2122745/The_Evolution_and_Dynamics_of_Urban_Poverty_in_Zambia  
39
 Unfortunately, more recent data on land use in Lusaka or other Zambian cities was unavailable at the time of 
this report’s publication.  
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The Employment Landscape in (Urban) Zambia 
 
While policymakers grappling with rapid urbanization often focus on solving issues related to 
service delivery, such as waste management and piped water, the growth of cities also means 
growth in the demand for urban jobs – a challenge that policymakers in Zambia have yet to 
prioritize. Population projections from the Zambian government suggest that Zambia’s urban 
working age population (aged 15-64) will grow by 3.7 million people between 2015 and 2035, 
1 million of whom will be youth (ages 15-24) (see Figure 6).40  Given Zambia’s high urban 
labor force participation rate, which stood at 74.7 percent in 2014,41 this translates into a 
requirement of nearly 2.8 million net new urban jobs over the next 20 years, with over 1.2 
million urban jobs required in the next 10 years.  
 
Within Zambia’s urban job creation plans, a key priority must be ensuring pathways for young 
people to enter the labor market. Today, youth make up 40 percent of the working age 
population in cities, and in 2035 they will still comprise about a third of all working age 
people.42   
 
 
*Working age population is defined as all those 15-64 years of age. Youth is defined as those aged 15-24. 
Source: Population and Housing Census (2011-2035) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Population and Housing Census, Zambia 2011-2035. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://zambia.opendataforafrica.org/ZMPHC2015/population-and-housing-census-of-zambia-2011-2035  
41
 World Development Indicators, World Bank Accessed April 20, 2016. http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators  
42
 Population and Housing Census, Zambia 2011-2035. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://zambia.opendataforafrica.org/ZMPHC2015/population-and-housing-census-of-zambia-2011-2035  
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How employment is shifting 
 
The sectoral shifts in employment in Zambia offer clues to how the country is urbanizing. One 
of the most defining trends – which signals unmistakably a move toward more urban 
livelihoods – is the movement out of agriculture among Zambian workers. Between 2008 and 
2014, the share of all Zambian workers in agriculture fell from 71.4 percent to 48.9 percent.43  
 
The speed of this exodus out of agriculture – an average annual drop of 3.75 percent in 
agricultural share of employment over the six-year period – is almost unparalleled when 
considering other countries in the process of structural transformation. For purpose of 
comparison, Bangladesh and Cambodia, which like Zambia are Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) witnessing fast-paced economic growth, have seen their share of workers in 
agriculture decline by an average annual rate of 1.5 percent and 2 percent, respectively.  In 
Tanzania the figure is about 1 percent.44  
 
Part of the reason for the rapid movement of workers out of agriculture may be the fact that 
productivity in the sector has been increasing markedly, with an influx of experienced and 
well-capitalized farmers from South Africa and Zimbabwe, a growing cohort of medium-scale 
farmers with access to capital, and increases in foreign direct investment in agriculture.45 The 
movement toward a more capital-intensive form of Zambian agriculture has boosted the 
sector’s output, but has also perhaps decreased the demand for agricultural labor.  
 
Where do the Zambian workers leaving agriculture wind up? 
 
Employment trends in non-farm sectors offer several insights – some positive, some 
worrying. The informal economy – where jobs are more likely to be low-paid, low-
productivity, insecure and unsafe – has seen most of the employment growth in non-farm 
sectors. In 2008, 66.2 percent of all non-farm jobs were informal, but by 2014 the figure had 
risen to 80.7 percent.46  
 
Among the sectors that have expanded the most rapidly since 2008 is informal community, 
social and personal services.47 This catch-all term encapsulates many of the low-value-added 
service sector occupations that proliferate across the developing world, such as domestic 
work. By 2014, there were over 1.2 million people employed in these informal services, over 
                                                 
43
 Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force Survey 2008 and 2014. Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/report/Demo/2008%20Labourforce%20Survey%20Report.pdf (Note: LFS 2014 is 
not available in the public domain and was made available separately to the authors.) 
44
 World Development Indicators, World Bank Accessed April 20, 2016. http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators (Note: For Bangladesh and Cambodia, timeframe is 2000 to 2010. For 
Tanzania, timeframe is 2006 to 2014.) 
45
 2015 Global Agricultural Productivity Report. Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
http://www.globalharvestinitiative.org/GAP/2015_GAP_Report.pdf 
46
 Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force Survey 2008 and 2014. Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/report/Demo/2008%20Labourforce%20Survey%20Report.pdf (Note: LFS 2014 is 
not available in the public domain and was made available separately to the authors.) 
47
 The Labor Force Survey 2008 has ten sector classifications with ‘Community, Social and Personal Services’ 
being used as a catch-all category for various kinds of services. Since 2012, the Labor Force Survey has split 
these into nine new categories resulting in 21 sector categories. For purposes of comparison, the authors 
maintain the aggregated category in analysis of 2012 and 2014 trends.  
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1 million of whom were engaged in “activities of households as employer” – domestic work 
like cleaning, cooking, and gardening.48 Many of those leaving farm work are staying home, 
toiling as unpaid family workers, while others are seeking informal jobs in the homes of 
others. The trend illustrates a lack of productive jobs available to those who leave the 
agricultural sector. 
 
Other kinds of urban service sectors are among those where growth in employment has been 
rapid. Employment in the wholesale and retail trade sector expanded by 64 percent between 
2008 and 2014 – from about 426,000 workers to nearly 700,000 (see Table 2). Logistics and 
hospitality also grew quickly: employment in the Transportation and Storage sector and the 
Hotels & Restaurants sector expanded by 60 percent and 72 percent, respectively. 
Manufacturing employment grew by 41 percent in the same period, but still employs only 
about 224,000 Zambians. 
 
Despite the fact that most of this employment growth was informal, a few sectors 
maintained impressive formal employment growth. In hospitality and community, social, and 
personal services, formal employment grew by 58 percent and 44 percent, respectively, 
though absolute numbers remain small. The manufacturing sector saw significant growth in 
formal employment between 2008 and 2012, when it grew by almost 50 percent, though a 
slight contraction in formal manufacturing jobs occurred between 2012 and 2014 (see Table 
2). 
 
The construction sector is one of the bright spots in the labor market. Employment in 
construction expanded by 128 percent between 2008 and 2014, with formal jobs in 
construction more than doubling. The trend signals urban expansion as well as growing 
public investment in infrastructure.  
 
Importantly, these employment figures predate the dramatic downturn in the Zambian 
economy. The rapid depreciation of Zambia’s currency and the energy crisis that are 
currently affecting the country may have the effect of reversing some of the positive trends 
in the labor market and exacerbating the worrying trends. For example, formal employment 
may be scaled back, compelling even more Zambian workers to take up jobs in the informal 
economy.  
 
                                                 
48
 Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force Survey 2014. (LFS 2014 is not yet available in the public 
domain.) 
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Source: Labor Force Survey (2008, 2012, 2014) 
 
 
         
Source: Labor Force Survey (2008, 2012, 2014) 
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Table 2. Sector-Wise Employment – Formal, Informal and Total (2008, 2012, 2014)49 
 
 
Sector 
Formal Employment 
('000s) 
Informal Employment 
('000s) 
Total Employment  
('000s) 
2008 2012 2014 2008 2012 2014 2008 2012 2014 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 
72 50 52 3212 2821 2812 3284 2871 2864 
Mining and Quarrying 62 65 57 31 23 25 93 88 82 
Manufacturing 37 55 45 122 161 179 159 216 224 
Electricity, Gas and 
Water 
11 14 17 3 10 10 14 24 27 
Construction 14 19 31 66 169 152 80 188 183 
Trade, Wholesale and 
Retail 
29 34 34 397 610 658 426 644 692 
Transportation and 
Storage 
29 34 29 65 103 123 94 137 152 
Hotels and Restaurants 17 22 27 25 40 45 42 62 72 
Financial, Insurance 
and Real Estate 
13 21 13 6 35 10 19 56 23 
Community, Social and 
Personal Services 
226 311 325 161 902 1215 387 1213 1540 
 
        Source: Labor Force Survey (2008, 2012, 2014) 
 
Growth: Employment vs GDP in urban sectors 
 
The analysis of sector-wise employment growth must be accompanied by an examination of 
how sector-wise contribution to Zambia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is changing. 
Juxtaposing trends in sector-wise employment share and sector-wise GDP share can shed 
light on important questions: How productive are the new jobs that certain sectors are 
creating? How sustainable is job growth in particular sectors?  
 
In Zambia, several sectors where urban jobs are concentrated and growing are in fact 
declining in terms of their contribution to Zambia’s overall GDP. The manufacturing and trade 
sectors demonstrate this trend (see Figures 9 and 10). Both sectors still contribute more to 
GDP than to employment – meaning that productivity per worker is higher in both than in the 
overall economy. But as these sectors become more prominent in their contribution to 
employment – 26 percent of urban workers are now employed in either manufacturing or 
trade – they become less important in terms of their contribution to GDP.  
 
                                                 
49
 The LFS 2008 defines informal and formal employment by combining the concepts of employment in 
informal/formal enterprises and informal/formal employment. In 2012 and 2014, the LFS separates 
informal/formal employment from employment in informal/formal enterprises, as is international best practice. 
This must be taken into account when assessing 2008 data against 2012 and 2014 data. 
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     Source: Central Statistical Office and Labor Force Survey (2008, 2012, 2014) 
 
 
     Source: Central Statistical Office and Labor Force Survey (2008, 2012, 2014) 
 
 
There are a few possible explanations for this trend.  It may signal that productivity per 
worker is declining in these sectors, compelling firms to hire more employees. Another 
possibility is that productivity in these sectors is still rising as they absorb more workers, but 
growing more slowly than the overall economy. A final possibility is that these sectors are 
seeing rapid growth of micro and small enterprises that are still in their initial stages of 
growth; these enterprises may be employing significant numbers of people but may not be 
particularly productive or prolific in terms of their output. Given the Zambian government’s 
strong emphasis on the formation of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), this is 
the most likely explanation. 
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In any case, the problem remains that, for any sector, a rising share of employment and a 
declining share of GDP is not a desirable trend. Unless their productivity and output grow 
alongside the overall economy, it is likely that firms in the manufacturing and trade sectors 
will eventually find themselves unable to absorb more workers. Moreover, workers in these 
sectors are unlikely to experience substantial wage growth as long as this trend persists. As 
long as workers are sharing low-productivity work, they will be unable to realize their full 
productive potential.  
 
Firm-level investments, such as technology, or improvements in the business environment in 
which these firms operate, can improve productivity, facilitate upgrading, and ensure that 
the manufacturing and trade sectors continue to employ growing numbers of workers. So 
can skill development, in which the government has stepped up investment (See Zambia’s 
Current Approach to Job Creation). This is particularly critical in the case of manufacturing, 
which is most often the backbone of job-rich urbanization.  
 
 
Employment outcomes in urban Zambia 
 
The sectoral shifts occurring in Zambia – that is, the movement out of agriculture into low-
productivity and informal services in urban areas – are mirrored in the employment 
outcomes of urban workers.  
 
Labor force participation, unemployment and underemployment50 
 
Labor force participation has generally increased across urban Zambia since 2008 – from 62.9 
to 74.7 percent (see Figure 11). While it fell slightly in Lusaka Province between 2012 and 
2014 – from 74.5 to 72.6 percent – it remains much higher than it was in 2008, when it stood 
at only 65.6 percent. The Copperbelt observed a similar trend of increasing labor force 
participation, while rural Zambia saw a relatively stable labor force participation rate, 
hovering around 80 percent.  
 
Despite an increasing proportion of urban dwellers participating in the workforce, urban 
unemployment has fallen – from 18.1 to 11.5 percent between 2008 and 2014 (see Figure 
12) – a positive indication that the labor market is not only absorbing new entrants but also 
incorporating those who were previously out of work, even if through informal work.  
 
Nevertheless, the upward trend in underemployment in urban areas – from 3.4 to 4.8 
percent over the same time period – calls attention to a possible increase in low-productivity 
work (see Figure 13).  Underemployment remains, however, far lower in urban Zambia than 
                                                 
50
 The Zambian government defines these terms accordingly: Labor force participation rate is the percentage of 
the population aged 15 and above that is either employed or looking for work. The unemployment rate is 
defined as the share of the labor force that is jobless but looking for employment. Underemployment is defined 
as a situation in which the number of working hours is insufficient in relation to an alternative employment 
situation in which the individual would be willing and able to work for more hours. The underemployment rate 
is the percentage of underemployed individuals as a share of all employed individuals. The reference period in 
labor force surveys is the previous seven days. 
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in rural areas, where seasonality of employment in agriculture contributes to a rate of nearly 
11 percent. 
 
 
        Source: Labor Force Survey (2008, 2012, 2014) 
 
 
 
        Source: Labor Force Survey (2008, 2012, 2014) 
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        Source: Labor Force Survey (2008, 2012, 2014) 
 
 
Wages  
 
Trends in compensation tell a far less positive story. More workers are entering the labor 
market, and fewer find themselves unemployed, but the job outcomes they face call into 
question the type of urbanization Zambia is witnessing. 
 
The most startling labor market trend in Zambia today is the decline in real wages in the 
country’s most urbanized provinces. In real terms, average monthly earnings among paid 
workers51 in both Lusaka and the Copperbelt declined between 2012 and 2014, though in 
Zambia overall real earnings rose (see Figure 14). This trend makes evident that the labor 
markets of the most urbanized regions of Zambia are underperforming relative the rest of 
the country.  
 
While real wages among paid urban workers increased slightly at the national level – growing 
about 5.9 percent between 2012 and 2014 – the growth paled in comparison to that 
witnessed by rural paid workers, who saw their wages rise by 26.7 percent in the same 
period. Urban paid workers in Lusaka, the largest urban labor market in the country, saw a 
decline in their wages of about 17 percent between 2012 and 2014 in real terms.  
 
                                                 
51
 In the context of compensation statistics, the Zambian Labor Force Survey includes apprentices and interns in 
the category of “paid worker.” 
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        Source: Labor Force Survey (2012, 2014)52 
 
Pay differentials between rural and urban workers in Zambia are much smaller than would be 
anticipated in a country that is rapidly urbanizing. The difference between average monthly 
earnings among paid workers in rural and urban Zambia is only 10.6 percent – before taking 
into account the difference in cost of living (see Figure 15).53 In India, another developing 
country experiencing rapid urbanization, the rural-urban wage differential is 25 percent – 
after taking into account the difference in cost of living.54 
 
 
        Source: Labor Force Survey (2014) 
 
The low earnings potential of urban workers becomes starker when examining the informal 
economy. As of 2014, rural informal paid workers were actually earning 13.5 percent more 
than their urban counterparts (see Figure 16). In considering this trend, however, one must 
bear in mind that a far greater percentage of rural workers are self-employed or unpaid 
                                                 
52
 Consumer Price Index was used as the deflator to calculate real wages. The wages are expressed in terms of 
2010 Kwacha. 
53
 Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force Survey 2014. (LFS 2014 is yet not available in the public domain) 
54
 Kaivan Munshi, Mark Rosenzweig. 2013. Networks and Misallocation: Insurance, Migration, and the Rural-
Urban Wage gap. Accessed April 20, 2016.  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/intranet/calendar/munshi-rosenzweig_10_13.pdf  
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family workers – that is, not paid employees – so this statistic does not compare all informal 
rural workers to all informal urban workers.  
 
While the Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces host over 60 percent of paid employees in 
Zambia, the number of unpaid family workers is still growing faster in absolute terms than 
the number of paid workers in both provinces. Between 2008 and 2012 – a relatively positive 
period for the labor market – Lusaka’s workforce added roughly the same number of unpaid 
family workers as it did paid employees, and the Copperbelt’s workforce added 43 percent 
more unpaid family workers than paid employees.55 These figures tell a different side of the 
same story, further evincing the fact that workers in the most urbanized provinces have few 
productive employment opportunities available to them.   
 
 
       Source: Labor Force Survey (2014) 
 
        Source: Labor Force Survey (2014) 
 
 
One bright spot in wage trends is among public sector employees. Between 2008 and 2014, 
central government employees saw their wages rise 81.5 percent in real terms, and local 
                                                 
55
 Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force Survey 2008 and 2012. Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/nada/index.php/catalog/61; 
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/nada/index.php/catalog/62 
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government employees saw theirs grow by 76.1 percent. This wage growth was far more 
impressive than that among any other group of paid workers. However, the share of workers 
employed by the government is declining. Among all workers, it shrunk from 5.5 percent to 
4.4 percent between 2008 and 2014. Among paid employees, the share shrunk from 30.7 
percent to 19.7 percent in the same period.56 
 
These trends point to the severe lack of productive jobs in urban areas, outside the small, 
and shrinking, formal sector, which employs just over a quarter of urban Zambians.57 The 
trend of declining real wages in urban Zambia could be driven by multiple factors. For one, 
Zambia’s rapid pace of structural transformation – with an employment shift from agriculture 
to industry and services that is faster than in comparator countries – may be placing 
downward pressure on wages in urban sectors (see the earlier discussion of this 
phenomenon in Lusaka will continue to dominate the urban landscape). Another possibility is 
that rural areas are receiving greater government attention, while urban areas are suffering 
from poor infrastructure and underinvestment (see Zambia’s Current Approach to Job 
Creation: A rural bias?); this may be constricting the productivity, and therefore wages, of 
urban jobs.  
 
 
Comparing urban regions 
 
An urban worker’s likelihood of finding employment, and the type of employment s/he will 
find, depends on the region in which s/he resides. The country hosts two heavily urbanized 
provinces – Lusaka and the Copperbelt – both with an urbanization rate above 80 percent.58  
 
Economic fortunes in these two provinces do not always align, given the different structures 
of their economic output and labor markets. For example, while urban unemployment in the 
Copperbelt grew between 2008 and 2012 and fell between 2012 and 2014, the inverse trend 
was observed in Lusaka (see Figure 12). In 2012, the Copperbelt was suffering from 23 
percent urban unemployment, whereas Lusaka’s urban unemployment rate stood at just 7 
percent.  
 
Partly, the difference in employment outcomes between Lusaka and the Copperbelt stems 
from the sectoral composition of their economies. The economy in the Copperbelt – shaped 
by large-scale investment in the mining sector – is driven more by global factors, like the 
demand for copper exports. Though its workers find themselves more vulnerable to the 
boom-bust cycle of the mining industry, they also earn more. As of 2014, average monthly 
earnings among paid workers in the Copperbelt were 24 percent higher than the national 
average. Surprisingly, given that it contains the country’s capital and largest city, paid workers 
in Lusaka province were earning about 20 percent less than the national average (see Figure 
18).  
 
                                                 
56
 Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force Survey 2008 and 2014. 
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/nada/index.php/catalog/61; LFS 2014 is yet not available in the public domain. 
57
 Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force Survey 2014. (LFS 2014 is yet not available in the public domain) 
58
 Population and Housing Census, Zambia 2011-2035. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://zambia.opendataforafrica.org/ZMPHC2015/population-and-housing-census-of-zambia-2011-2035 
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The distribution of employment across industries suggests greater diversification in Lusaka, 
however. The share of workers in key urban sectors – construction, hospitality and logistics – 
is nearly double in Lusaka compared to the share in the Copperbelt.59 This is part of the 
reason for Lusaka’s lower unemployment – a diverse informal economy that has the capacity 
to absorb more workers. Lusaka’s labor market also exhibits a smaller gender wage gap.  Men 
in the Copperbelt earn 26 percent more than women, whereas in Lusaka the figure stands at 
11 percent (see Figure 18).  
 
 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force Survey 2012, 2014. 
*To show earnings in constant prices, the currency has been deflated to 2010 Kwacha.  
However, the figures reflect the Kwacha in its re-based, post-2013 form. 
 
Zambia’s Current Approach to Job Creation: A rural bias? 
 
Job creation is already high on the list of priorities for the Zambian government. The policy 
framework in place to achieve sustained job growth has three distinguishing features: (1) it 
emphasizes the formation and growth of micro, small and medium enterprises; (2) it seeks to 
promote diversification and higher-value-added activities; and (3) it places emphasis on rural 
areas of the country. 
 
The country’s policies supporting MSMEs are seen as a way to bolster youth employment, 
reduce poverty and enhance the MSME contribution to GDP – as approximately 88 percent 
of the Zambian workforce is employed in informal MSMEs.60 Promotion of entrepreneurship 
is the linchpin of these policies – with incubation programs, technology innovation schemes, 
and even SME universities planned.  An Upstream and Downstream Industries Collaborative 
                                                 
59
 Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force Survey 2014. (LFS 2014 is yet not available in the public domain) 
60
 Zambia Business Survey. 2010. The Profile and Productivity of Zambian Businesses. Accessed April 20, 2016, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTZAMBIA/Resources/The_Profile_and_Productivity_of_Zambian_Business
es.pdf 
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will seek to develop SMEs in the manufacturing sector by establishing supply chains and 
subcontracting networks between SMEs and large enterprises. And the Go Global Initiative 
seeks to enhance the ability of SMEs to export their products internationally through a 
comprehensive support package and preferential low interest loans.61  
 
Linking these MSMEs to supply chains to stimulate upgrading is one way Zambia seeks to 
promote higher-value-added activities, diversify its non-agricultural economy and reduce 
dependence on the volatile mining sector. Manufacturing, particularly agro-processing, 
construction, and tourism are the purported priority sectors. In the government’s vision, 
Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZs) – similar to “special economic zones” – will be the 
nodes through which supply chains are built.62 It has also sought to encourage more 
innovation and technological advancement by modernizing the country’s intellectual 
property laws. 
 
The current MSME and industrial policies carry a strong emphasis on developing rural 
Zambia. The Revised Sixth National Development Plan (2013-16) “focuses on public capital 
investments that have a bias to rural development.”63 Moreover, the youth employment 
policy defines the country’s overarching “framework for growth and employment expansion” 
as a “rural industrialization strategy.”64 Ninety percent of the funds allocated to the industrial 
clusters program are restricted to rural areas.65 Skill development policies have also favored 
rural Zambia in recent years; between 2008 and 2014, skilled workers as a share of all 
employed rural workers jumped from 3.2 to 16.9 percent, while in urban areas the rise was 
minimal by comparison – from 17.5 to 20.9 percent.66 Moreover, the national development 
plan directs national savings and credit banks to prioritize lending to rural entrepreneurs.67  
                                                 
61
 Government of Zambia. 2014. Small and Medium Enterprise Development Strategy (DRAFT). (Note: This 
document was provided privately to the authors and is not available in the public domain.) 
62
 Zambia’s Multi-Facility Economic Zones policy was introduced in 2005 and the zones were declared in 2007. 
According to the government, the MFEZs are special industrial zones for both export-oriented and domestic-
oriented industries, though most are funded through public-private partnerships with foreign companies. The 
government claims that they blend the best features of the free trade zones, export processing zones, and 
industrial parks. The main offering to companies is a zero tax rate on profits and dividends and zero import 
tariffs on raw materials, capital goods and machinery for the first five years. (Source: 
http://www.mcti.gov.zm/index.php/investing-in-zambia/multifacility-economic-zones; 
http://www.zda.org.zm/?q=content/multi-facility-economic-zone-mfez) 
63
 The Revised Sixth National Development Plan (2013-16) Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
http://www.gwp.org/Global/Activities/Impact Stories/Supporting documents/Revised Sixth National 
Development Plan.pdf 
64
 Ministry of Youth and Sport, Government of Zambia. 2015. Action Plan for Youth Empowerment and 
Employment. Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
http://www.mofnp.gov.zm/jdownloads/Policy%20Documents/2015%20NATIONAL%20YOUTH%20POLICY%20A
ND%20ACTION%20PLAN/action_plan_for_youth_empowerment_and_employment.pdf  
65
 Ministerial Statement on the Status of the Industrial Clusters Development Programme. March 2015. 
Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/images/publication_docs/Ministerial%20Statement%20-
%20Cluster%20development%20(Final%20-%20A5%20version).pdf  
66
 Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force Survey 2008 and 2014. Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/report/Demo/2008%20Labourforce%20Survey%20Report.pdf (Note: LFS 2014 is 
not available in the public domain and was made available separately to the authors.) 
67
 The Revised Sixth National Development Plan (2013-16) Accessed on April 20, 2016. 
http://www.gwp.org/Global/Activities/Impact%20Stories/Supporting%20documents/Revised%20Sixth%20Natio
nal%20Development%20Plan.pdf  
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The Zambian government’s job creation initiatives are, for the most part, grounded in a  
sound approach. Supporting MSMEs, fostering a move up the value chain, emphasizing agro-
processing as a bridge between agriculture and manufacturing, and focusing on exports are 
all appropriate strategies for employing the country’s growing working age population. In 
some priority areas, significant progress has been made – for example, in the development of 
rural clusters.  
 
In some cases, however, there is a disconnect between the ambitious plans put forward in 
policy documents and the situation on the ground. In the case of MFEZs, for example, job 
creation is one of the stated aims of these special zones. But only about 10,000 jobs have 
been created in the six MFEZs declared in 2007, and over 80 percent of those jobs are in just 
one of the zones.68 Another issue raised by the Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and 
Research (ZIPAR) in a recent report is the fact that MSME policies are designed primarily to 
support small- and medium-sized enterprises, lacking a framework that can realistically 
support the needs of micro-enterprises and self-employed entrepreneurs – the source of 
employment for 44 percent of Zambian workers.69  
 
The rural bias in job creation strategies also requires deeper reflection among policymakers. 
While developing Zambia’s rural areas is important to ensure equity in economic 
development, the government should avoid prioritizing rural areas at the expense of its 
urban regions. The fact that paid worker earnings in Zambia’s biggest urban economies are 
declining (see Figure 14) while rural wages are growing should motivate a rebalancing of the 
geographic emphasis in job creation policies. If leaders in Zambia mistake urban as a proxy 
for economic prosperity, then the trend of worsening employment outcomes in Zambian 
cities will continue.  
 
Moreover, given the resource crunch facing the Zambian government in the context of the 
declining value of the Kwacha, it is worth considering that urban areas – due to their 
agglomeration effects and internal economies of scale – are more efficient job creators in 
non-agricultural sectors than are rural areas. The impact of smart investment in labor-
intensive sectors is greater in urban areas, since city-based enterprises have the built-in 
benefits of connectivity, a bigger labor market, and inter-firm learning or “knowledge 
spillovers.” Furthermore, it is easier in cities, logistically and financially, to deliver other kinds 
of productivity-enhancing public services – such as electricity and transportation – that 
enable firms to thrive. Geographic dispersion, meanwhile, comes with extra costs of 
production and trade, for the firm and for the government services supporting it.70 
 
                                                 
68
 Email correspondence with Zambia Development Authority, 22 March 2016. 
69
 ZIPAR. 2015. Unexploited Potential: A critical review of policies supporting the self employed in Zambia. 
Accessed on April 20, 
2016. http://www.zipar.org.zm/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&alias=50-unexploited-
potential-a-critical-review-of-policies-supporting-the-self-employed-in-zambia&category_slug=flagship-
documents&Itemid=120 
70
 Ivan Turok. 2014. Linking Urbanization and Development in Africa’s economic revival. Accessed April 20, 
2016.https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ivan_Turok/publication/262802198_Linking_urbanisation_and_dev
elopment_in_Africa's_economic_revival/links/00b49538e29f888904000000.pdf?origin=publication_list 
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The strong potential for Zambia’s cities to be centers of productive employment creation is 
evinced by the difference in earnings between Zambia’s urban and rural firms. While 70 
percent of MSMEs in Zambia have reported sales of less than 500 Kwachas per month, 76 
percent of microenterprises in Zambia’s major cities have monthly sales of greater than 2,000 
Kwachas.71 However, the lack of a coherent, jobs-focused policy framework for Zambia’s 
cities means their potential to create productive employment is circumscribed. 
 
Without neglecting the importance of equitable development across the entire country, 
Zambian policymakers should recognize that their industrial policies must harness the 
benefits of urban economies in order to maximize good job creation and growth. 
 
 
Managing Urbanization for More and Better Jobs: A Policy Framework 
 
Zambia requires a new way of managing urbanization in order to promote the creation of 
more and better employment in its cities and meet the growing demand for urban jobs – 2.8 
million over the next two decades. This new policy framework must accelerate positive 
trends, like the decline in urban unemployment, and reverse worrisome trends, like the 
decline in real earnings in both the country’s major urban regions.  
 
This section first outlines three core principles that must guide the thinking of policymakers 
as they evaluate strategies for promoting job-rich urbanization in Zambia. These principles 
grow out of lessons learned by urban planners and policymakers around the globe over the 
last half-century, but they are tailored to the challenges that Zambia currently confronts.    
 
The policy recommendations that follow are not an exhaustive list of all the reforms that 
must be introduced; rather, they represent concrete examples of how an approach based on 
these principles could manifest in specific policies, taking into account Zambia’s particular 
challenges and opportunities.  
 
1. Zambia must focus on managing existing urban systems, rather than trying to create 
them anew.  
 
Like many countries in the emerging world, Zambian policymakers have often made 
the mistake of envisioning and executing master plans that are divorced from the 
realities of how Zambia’s urban citizens live and work and how its urban economies 
function.72,73 The result in many cases is that municipal planning acts as an 
impediment to, rather than a facilitator of, a better functioning urban labor market.  
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 Kedia Shah. 2012. The Informal Sector in Zambia: Can it Disappear? Should it Disappear? Accessed April 21, 
2016, http://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Kedia-Shah-2012-Working-Paper.pdf (Note: These 
figures have been adjusted from the original source according to the rebasing of the Kwacha in 2013.) 
72
 Wilma Nchito. 2006. An Analysis of the location of markets in Lusaka. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://www.isocarp.net/Data/case_studies/816.pdf 
73
 Deborah Potts, 2007. The State and the Informal in Sub-Saharan African Urban Economies: Revisiting Debates 
on Dualism. London School of Economics, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper No. 18. 
 
  34 
The alternative approach is to take stock of existing urban systems – such as informal 
settlements and informal systems for trading and selling goods and services – and 
determine the ways in which the state can make those systems operate better: more 
efficiently, more safely, and with better outcomes for the involved stakeholders. By 
engaging with these systems, government agencies also create inroads that can be 
utilized to encourage and incentivize formalization.  
 
What does this principle mean in practice? It could mean, for example, a focus on 
revitalizing and diversifying the Copperbelt – Zambia’s historic industrial belt – rather 
than building a brand new economic corridor for industrial production. Or it may 
mean placing equal emphasis on upgrading informal settlements as on stimulating 
the growth of new real estate developments. 
 
This approach is more practical, and it’s also more cost-effective than the types of 
greenfield infrastructure investments that seek to remake cities completely – a 
primary concern for Zambia as it likely faces severe fiscal constraints for years to 
come. 
 
2. Zambian cities must enable businesses – particularly micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) – to expand, increase productivity, and (eventually) enter the 
formal economy.  
 
Current policies in Zambia emphasize the formation and growth of MSMEs in order to 
spur job creation – particularly for youth.74 But urban firms, and particularly the small, 
informal enterprises that are formed through policies that promote entrepreneurship 
and microfinance, face a built environment and urban policy framework that is not 
conducive to their growth and prosperity.  
 
A range of policy interventions at the urban scale is required to enable businesses, 
especially MSMEs, to expand and become more efficient. For example, improving 
firms’ access to productivity-enhancing services like piped water and electricity and 
upgrading the infrastructure at urban markets would be good initial steps. 
 
Beyond giving firms more of the tools necessary to grow and be productive, the policy 
framework for urban enterprises must include pathways to formalization. While it is 
impractical to imagine that the vast and growing informal economy in urban Zambia 
can be rapidly formalized, it is crucial to create incentives for firms to become formal 
over time. This will ensure that (a) tax revenues support the growing infrastructure 
needs in Zambian cities in the long run, and (b) the quality of jobs in the urban labor 
market steadily improves.  
 
3. Urban planning and infrastructure investment must focus on strengthening the links 
among firms and between firms and consumers.  
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 The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy, 2008. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
www.zda.org.zm/?q=download/file/fid/72 
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Beyond giving urban firms more tools to grow and prosper, Zambia’s investments in 
cities and beyond must advance the goal of strengthening the links within local, 
provincial, national and international supply chains. Rail and road infrastructure 
projects must take into account the needs of micro, small and medium enterprises – 
especially those in labor-intensive sectors like agro-processing, textiles, and wood 
products. Zambian businesses need not only government support in traditional forms 
– training and low-cost finance – but require a broader enabling environment that can 
help them connect with one another and with larger foreign enterprises. 
 
This is particularly crucial to ensuring that foreign investment entering Zambia is 
leveraged not purely for the export of raw commodities, such as copper, but is 
embedded in economic relationships with Zambian firms.  Once those inter-firm webs 
are woven, investment is more likely to remain in Zambia, preventing enclave 
economies or other arrangements not beneficial for the country.  
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
With these three core principles as a guiding framework, Zambian policymakers have before 
them concrete and actionable steps that can be taken to promote the job-creating functions 
of the country’s urban areas. 
 
 Bolster efforts to recognize and upgrade informal settlements. 
 
Governance of informal settlements is generally relegated to policy frameworks that 
deal specifically with urban housing. In reality, informal settlements are not only the 
place of residence for over 70 percent of Zambia’s urban residents; they are also 
centers of economic activity and employment75 – representing a physical home for 
the vast informal urban economy, which employs 72 percent of the country’s urban 
workforce.76 
 
Currently, the efficiency and productivity of businesses operating in informal 
settlements is stifled by several factors: poor connectivity to markets; lack of 
willingness to invest in better facilities and technology due to insecurity of tenure; 
and limited scale of operations owing to lack of space.77 While forward-thinking 
proposals are on the table to enhance access of small businesses to Zambia’s Multi-
Facility Economic Zones (MFEZs),78 the reality is that the vast majority of urban 
MSMEs will continue to operate out of informal settlements for the foreseeable 
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 Urban Habitat: Zambia, Published on August 26, 2014. Accessed April 20, 2016. https://www.wm-urban-
habitat.org/eng/zambia/ 
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 Urban Employment in the informal sector/Urban labor force. Central Statistical Office, Zambia. Labor Force 
Survey 2014. (LFS 2014 is not yet available in the public domain.) 
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 Jain, Chileshe, Muwowo, Lupiya. 2016. Perceptions of Customary Land Tenure Security in Western Province of 
Zambia. Accessed April 20, 2016.  http://redfame.com/journal/index.php/ijsss/article/view/1264;  
Zambia Business Survey. 2010. The profile and productivity of businesses in Zambia. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/06/16362605/zambia-zambia-business-survey-vol-1-5-
profile-productivity-zambian-businesses 
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 For example, the Lusaka South MFEZ plans to set up an SME Fund, SME Credit Guarantee Initiative, and SME 
Tax Incentives Package, as per its Small and Medium Enterprise Development Strategy. 
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future. If Zambian policymakers hope that MSMEs – led by a government emphasis 
on entrepreneurship – can sustain job creation, they must address the built 
environment issues faced by such businesses. 
 
Many of the issues that small, informal enterprises in urban areas face can be tackled 
by a more progressive and proactive approach to upgrading informal settlements. 
First of all, giving security of tenure to business-owners in informal settlements will 
encourage them to invest in their enterprises. Lack of security of tenure creates a 
disincentive for business-owners in informal settlements to make productivity-
enhancing investments in their enterprises. As Rikke Brandt Broegaard has pointed 
out, “unreliable property titles provide no guarantee that investors will reap the 
benefits of their efforts.”79 Evidence from Belize, Brazil, China, Thailand, and Turkey 
suggests that de jure security of tenure provides collateral for accessing credit, which 
can be used to upgrade physical structures or invest in enterprises housed in those 
structures.80,81,82 Over half of urban MSMEs in Zambia report that access to finance is 
a serious obstacle – making it the most common problem in the sector.83 
 
Beyond security of tenure, other forms of investment that governments can make in 
informal settlements also serve to promote the urban livelihoods they house. 
Improvements in basic infrastructure like roads can dramatically reduce the cost for 
firms to move their goods from workshops based in informal settlements to the 
urban markets where they sell to consumers – enabling higher profit margins and 
more capital to invest in workers and productivity enhancements.84 About a quarter 
of urban MSMEs currently report that transportation is a serious obstacle.85 
 
Enhancing access to electricity will have obvious benefits for enterprises based in 
informal settlements. Currently, only 24 percent of urban MSMEs have access to 
electricity. Zambian policymakers cannot expect MSMEs to be the backbone of the 
country’s industrialization strategy without providing basic services in the localities 
where most MSMEs operate.  
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Government policy in Zambia, unlike in many other developing countries, has 
generally not been antagonistic toward informal settlements.86 A process is in place 
for declaring informal settlements “Improvement Areas,” but only if they satisfy a 
long list of criteria, meaning that many settlements – particularly newer ones – are 
still unrecognized. Those who live in Improvement Areas supposedly have the right to 
30-year occupancy leases, but implementation of this provision is variable, and as of 
2002, only 12 percent of those living in informal settlements had a legal claim to the 
land on which they were living.87 Other kinds of infrastructure upgrading that 
Improvement Areas are entitled to has also been slow and mired in lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures. In other words, despite a friendly policy toward informal 
settlements on paper, the Zambian government largely has failed to deliver 
meaningful change for the residents and enterprises of these urban neighborhoods. 
An updated, streamlined policy, together with the full force of all the involved 
ministries and departments, is required for effective upgrading. 
 
Expanding security of tenure and providing basic services to informal settlements 
also carries another potential benefit: putting informal enterprises on the path to 
formalization. Once enterprises in informal settlements are given formal access to 
land, water, and electricity, local government is empowered to collect revenue in the 
form of lease payments and electricity and water bills. By pulling informal businesses 
out of the shadows, the next step to formalization – registering the firm and 
collecting information on its earnings and employees – comes within reach. This 
process can be undertaken carefully and incrementally, to ensure that the incentives 
to be formal continue to outweigh the burdens.  
 
Those pathways to formalization can also open up channels to implement active 
labor market policies, such as skills training programs or unemployment benefit 
schemes. Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have successfully 
formalized small firms by introducing special social security schemes for certain 
segments of workers, companies or sectors – targeting own-account workers, 
contributing family workers, and MSMEs.88 Upgrading of informal settlements 
enhances the ability for such formalization schemes and active labor market policies 
to reach the targeted group of firms and workers. 
 
Finally, the process of upgrading can itself act as a source of employment. Global best 
practices around informal settlement upgrading emphasize the importance of 
community involvement and participation.89 Construction and related activities 
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associated with infrastructure upgrading can source the necessary labor from the 
communities themselves –not only fostering a sense of ownership in informal 
settlements for the new public assets but also creating direct livelihood 
opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Extend cluster-based industrial policy to urban areas and upgrade urban markets9091 
 
While the mining sector, and in particular copper exports, have long driven the 
Zambian economy – with the majority of Zambians employed in agriculture – the 
manufacturing sector holds the key to formal economy job creation in Zambian cities. 
Because the sort of manufacturing undertaken in countries like Zambia is inherently 
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BOX 2 
Bolster efforts to recognize and upgrade informal settlements 
Action Plan 
 
1. Simplify the process for declaring unrecognized urban neighborhoods as 
Improvement Areas – which are legally entitled to occupancy leases and 
upgrading – by reducing the number of criteria involved (e.g. removing the 
stipulation that the settlement must have existed prior to 1974).  
2. Streamline the process for upgrading by establishing a special informal 
settlements upgrading committee – building on the inter-ministerial committee 
convened to intervene in informal settlements in mining areas90 – that has 
authorization to act on behalf of all the ministries and departments that carry 
out functions related to upgrading. 
3. In the processes of settlement upgrading, source construction labor from the 
locality in order to create direct employment and enhance community 
participation and buy-in. 
4. In city zonal plans, declare 2-3 newly upgraded informal settlements in each city 
“mixed-use zones” – legally open to both residential and commercial land use.91 
Utilize these settlements as a policy experiment to examine the social and 
economic benefits of mixed-use development in Zambian cities.  
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labor-intensive – concentrated in sectors like agro-processing, textiles, and wood 
products – the sector is crucial to non-farm employment generation. A growing share 
of Zambians work in manufacturing, though the figure stands at only 3.8 percent.92 
 
The trade sector has also emerged as a key employer for urban Zambians. About 12 
percent of all Zambians and 20.4 percent of urban Zambians are involved in wholesale 
and retail trade.93  
 
As in many economies at the beginning of structural transformation, manufacturing 
and trading activities in Zambia are still dominated by micro, small and medium 
enterprises.94 Successful emerging economies, including those that have managed to 
attract large-scale foreign investment, have all promoted the growth of MSMEs – 
partly because those firms form a supportive infrastructure for large firms by 
providing inputs and intermediate goods.95 Any job creation strategy, therefore, 
involves supporting MSMEs, particularly in trade and manufacturing.  
 
But these sectors have another common feature in Zambia. Both host a rising share of 
the workforce and a declining share of GDP (see Figures 9 and 10). This trend is a 
threat to the ability of these sectors to continue growing in terms of employment. It 
also demonstrates the need for a more supportive policy environment, especially in 
cities, where the manufacturing and trade sectors have the most potential for 
growth. 
 
With respect to manufacturing, the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry has 
made strides in supporting the development of industrial clusters in rural Zambia. The 
program promotes value-chain clusters – where firms in the same geographic area 
fulfill different functions along the value chain, from growing a primary product, to 
processing it, to marketing and distribution. As part of the Industrial Clusters 
Development Programme, the government is enabling mango juice production, cage 
fishing, rice processing, dairy processing, cotton processing, production of protein 
supplements, production of cooking oil, and processing of honey – creating 13,000 
direct jobs.96  
 
The cluster approach, while it can also succeed in rural areas, is naturally suited to an 
urban economy, as agglomeration effects inherently promote clustering. But the 
targeting for the Industrial Clusters Development Programme has been almost 
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exclusively rural – 90 percent according to the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and 
Industry.97 This policy decision is based on the false notion that Zambian cities are 
prospering while rural areas are languishing, when in fact real household earnings in 
Zambia’s biggest urban economies are in decline (see Figure 14) and rural wages are 
growing.  There is significant scope for promoting manufacturing activities in urban 
Zambia to improve employment outcomes in cities.   
 
Some may argue that for the agro-processing sector in particular, a rural 
industrialization policy is more intuitive. But that sort of policy direction makes more 
sense in countries where farmers have run out of space to expand. In Zambia, rural 
areas would benefit most from efforts to expand and commercialize the agriculture 
sector, as 32 percent of land in Zambia is fertile but unutilized.98 An effective strategy 
for developing the agro-processing sector, while maximizing the economic potential 
of rural and urban areas and creating jobs in both, would focus on boosting 
productivity and output in Zambia’s agriculture sector and then processing those 
goods in cities, where the benefits of economies of scale can be realized. This 
strategy, of course, requires strong linkages between rural and urban areas, but so 
does a rural industrialization strategy, as processed goods must ultimately be 
transported to larger markets. 
                                                 
97
 ibid. 
98
 FAO. 2006. Country Pasture Resource Profile: Zambia. Accessed April 19, 2016. 
http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpc/doc/counprof/zambia/zambia.htm 
  41 
 
 
The urban trading sector would also benefit from a more proactive policy approach. 
The Lusaka Master Plan unveiled the fact that nearly 40 percent of Lusaka’s urban 
markets, developed for the benefit of wholesale and retail traders, were lying vacant. 
This points to two factors: (1) a poor record on the part of urban authorities in 
maintaining urban markets and equipping them with basic facilities; and (2) poor 
planning decisions regarding where to locate markets. The latter is made further 
evident in the fact that traders are carrying out their vending activities near empty 
markets, but in more strategic locations – such as closer to a main road or other 
attraction than the market itself.99100101102103 
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BOX 3 
 
Tackling Urban Food Security and Urban Employment Together 
 
Food security, in addition to employment generation, is among the most 
important challenges facing cities in Zambia. Great scope exists for addressing 
both issues through common solutions. A substantial proportion of the roughly 70 
percent of urban Zambians who live in unplanned settlements are unemployed 
and lack basic education. With the right support and infrastructure, planned urban 
cultivation can boost this population’s income and at the same time address 
problems around access to healthy, affordable food. Moreover, the growth of 
agricultural, horticultural and livestock-rearing activities in peri-urban areas would 
create indirect employment in the logistics, transportation and trade sectors.  
 
Evidence from Zambia and other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that urban 
cultivation is widespread. While most of those who undertake urban farming do so 
for home consumption, a substantial number see it as an additional source of cash 
income.100,101 With support from government and non-profit organizations, the 
potential for urban and peri-urban agriculture to act as a source of employment 
and simultaneously address issues around food security can grow substantially. 
Models exist elsewhere in the region. For example, the Mazingira Institute in 
Kenya has trained about 3,000 urban farmers and also established networks for 
those trained farmers to mentor other cultivators, with a special emphasis on 
youth and women. The organization has also successfully lobbied the Nairobi city 
government to change its position from anti- to pro-urban farming.102  
 
The first step in Zambia will be to change existing legal norms that render urban 
agriculture illegal,103 and to support community-based initiatives that seek to 
support urban and peri-urban cultivators.  
XXX 
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A presidential decree in 2011 prohibited the removal or prosecution of street 
vendors, a positive step in decriminalizing one of urban Zambians’ most important 
livelihood activities. But this measure is at best a “band-aid” solution. The urban 
trading sector requires not the absence of any regulation, but rather a regulatory 
framework that affirms street vendors’ right to a livelihood while introducing a simple 
set of rules that take into account concerns around public health, sanitation, and 
congestion. India’s Street Vendor Act of 2014 is a good model. The law gives street 
vendors the right to obtain a vending certificate and to sell their goods in designated 
areas; stipulates a 30-day notice period before any street vendor can be relocated by 
authorities; and directs municipalities to set up a Town Vending Committee to 
manage and regulate street vending activities.104  
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 Improve intra- and intercity connectivity and leverage new infrastructure investments 
to stimulate growth of labor-intensive sectors105 
 
Connectivity – both within the city and between different centers of production – is 
one of the keys to leveraging the agglomeration effects of urban economies toward 
creating more and better jobs. 
 
When it comes to transport within Zambian cities, one of the primary challenges the 
country currently faces is affordability. As analysis by the Zambian Institute for Policy 
Analysis (ZIPAR) has shown, Lusaka is one of the most expensive cities in the world 
when it comes to public transportation. Measuring affordability in terms of the ratio 
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BOX 4 
Extend cluster-based industrial policy to urban areas and upgrade urban markets 
 
Action Plan 
 
1. Leverage the agglomeration effects of urban economies and the successful 
cluster model piloted in rural Zambia to roll out a cluster-based industrial 
policy for urban Zambia.  
a. Establish clusters that involve processing of an agricultural product 
on the urban periphery, where strong links to rural and “rurban”105 
areas already exist.  
b. For other kinds of industrial clusters utilize vacant urban land and/or 
facilitate the growth of existing clusters based in informal 
settlements. 
2. Introduce comprehensive legislation to promote a more rational street 
vending system in Zambian cities that accomplishes the following: 
a. Affirms the right of street vendors to a livelihood 
b. Establishes a simple, straightforward system for street vendors to 
obtain a permit to sell their goods in designated areas 
c. Sets in place a system for collecting nominal rents from street 
vendors to support public maintenance of the areas they occupy 
d. Provides a public budget for upgrading and widening the footpaths 
and other public spaces street vendors rely on, so as to avoid 
congestion arising from vendors occupying space designed for cars, 
cyclists, and pedestrians 
3. In consultation with the small-scale traders that rely on them, review the 
location and use of designated urban markets. For markets that are 
underutilized or poorly maintained, develop an action plan to relocate 
and/or upgrade them.  
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of bus fare to GDP per capita, transport in Lusaka is three times more expensive than 
Kampala, Uganda, and 10 times more expensive than Mumbai.106 
 
Today, the average Lusaka household spends 26 percent of its income on public 
transportation. Moreover, congestion leads to long commutes. Nearly 40 percent of 
riders on the Lusaka bus system report that an average trip takes longer than 40 
minutes, relatively long for a city of Lusaka’s size.107 
 
While the case for affordable public transit is usually made in terms of the 
environmental impact of private vehicle usage, there is a strong labor market 
argument for better transport connectivity.  
 
For one, a well-connected city where all members of the workforce can travel 
affordably facilitates better labor market matching.  The current situation – defined 
by expensive transportation and high levels of congestion – incentivizes a worker to 
seek employment that is proximate, rather than a job that is the right match for his or 
her skills. Limited mobility also constricts the flow of labor market information, as 
people from poorly connected parts of the city are unlikely to interact and share 
knowledge about training and employment opportunities.  
 
In short, a more affordable transportation system in Zambia’s cities would improve 
the quality of matching between firms and workers,108 which in turn promotes higher 
productivity for firms and higher compensation for workers.  
 
Better transport networks in Lusaka and smaller cities will also help small businesses 
that rely on the public transportation system to move their goods to market. 
Currently, 20 percent of urban MSMEs rely on buses to transport products.109 With a 
more affordable system, the cost of doing business would fall for these firms, freeing 
up more capital for growth- and productivity-enhancing investments. 
 
At a regional and national scale, Zambia is undertaking large-scale efforts to improve 
road and rail infrastructure. These investments hold the potential to strengthen 
linkages in the country’s supply chains and improve access to markets – local, 
national, and international – for urban MSMEs. Zambia is building or planning to build 
five new rail lines in addition to the TAZARA line, which links Zambia’s Central 
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Province to the Dar Es Salaam port.110 Road infrastructure has improved dramatically 
over the last two decades.111 Current and future road projects will focus on both 
construction of new road network and the rehabilitation of existing road 
infrastructure.112 In addition, the Road Development Agency has introduced a much 
needed Road Maintenance Plan (2014-2024) to ensure that newly constructed roads 
do not fall into disrepair and ultimately require expensive rehabilitation.113 
 
The impetus for these projects has largely come from Zambia’s mining industry, but 
the infrastructure must be harnessed to support the growth of labor-intensive 
sectors, which will bring far greater benefit to Zambia from the perspective of job 
creation. While the mining industry is dominated by large, multinational players that 
can afford relatively high transport costs, labor-intensive sectors such as agro-
processing and wood products are made up of many smaller players – MSMEs for 
whom high transport costs limit access to markets. The Zambian government must 
adopt a policy framework that enables enterprises in labor-intensive sectors to utilize 
the country’s growing infrastructure network. 
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 Revitalize and diversify the Copperbelt to create a more dynamic, job-creating urban 
region114 
 
The Copperbelt is undoubtedly one of the most important urban regions of Zambia. Its 
economic might is demonstrated by the fact that raw and refined copper – nearly all of which 
comes from the province – constitutes about 70 percent of the country’s total exports.115  
Moreover, 17 percent of the Zambian workforce and 18.4 percent of non-agricultural 
workers reside in the province.116 
 
Today, however, the economic fortunes of the Copperbelt are imperiled, largely because of 
its overdependence on the sector that has granted it prosperity. The economic slowdown in 
China and the fall in international commodity prices are hurting the copper industry 
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BOX 5 
Improve intra- and intercity connectivity and leverage new infrastructure 
investments to stimulate growth of labor-intensive sectors 
Action Plan 
 
1. Adopt the policy framework proposed by ZIPAR experts to improve 
affordability of public transportation in Lusaka. Based on better 
management of vehicle supply, addition of high-occupancy buses, and other 
innovations, the proposal would reduce costs for riders by close to 50 
percent.114 Treat the Lusaka intervention as a policy experiment – testing 
what works and what does not – and design policy interventions for other 
Zambian cities accordingly. 
2. Introduce policy innovations that can ease access to national and 
international transport networks for Zambian MSMEs seeking to sell their 
products in new markets. For instance: 
a. Introduce a discounted freight rate on Zambian railways for MSMEs in 
labor-intensive sectors (agro-processing, textiles, etc.);  
b. Introduce a freight charge system for MSMEs– who often cannot fill 
entire containers with their goods – that is per square foot rather than 
per container; and/or 
c. Introduce a discount on road tolls for MSMEs in labor-intensive sectors 
transporting their goods.  
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worldwide. Moreover, since 60 percent of the energy Zambia generates is used by the mining 
sector,117 the current energy crisis is yet another headwind battering the copper industry – 
compelling a 30 percent reduction in energy consumption.118 
119120121 
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BOX 6 
 
The Challenges of Municipal Governance in Zambia 
 
The implementation of a policy agenda around job-rich urbanization will inevitably require 
the cooperation and participation of urban local bodies across the country. However, like 
in many other countries throughout the global South, municipal authorities in Zambia 
suffer from several issues: (1) a lack of skilled personnel to engage in city planning and 
policymaking; (2) a lack of resources and overdependence on the central government for 
funds; and (3) mismanagement of resources.   
 
These problems are interconnected. While the Local Government Act of 1991 attempted 
to remove the authority of the central government over local urban governing bodies, 
allowing authorities to mobilize resources without seeking ministerial approval,119 the 
reality is that local governments remain highly dependent on the central government for 
funds.120 The Ministry of Local Government and Housing, therefore, sets the development 
agenda for cities; municipal and city councils have little control over the process of making 
policies, though they are responsible for implementing many of them. The lack of 
autonomy and ownership over urban governance exacerbates the inadequate supply of 
skilled personnel, the mismanagement of funds, and the ability of urban citizens to 
demand more of their local governments. One estimate suggests that the Ndola City 
Council spends 70 percent of its funds on salaries,121 an indication that Zambia’s urban 
bodies suffer from serious mismanagement of funds and/or function as vehicles for 
resource capture by local officials – as opposed to channels for provision of municipal 
services. 
 
The central government will need to design its policy frameworks for job-rich urbanization 
in ways that empower and challenge local authorities to become key stakeholders in the 
policymaking process. One positive development is a newly introduced system for 
selection of mayors in Zambian cities. While mayors were previously elected by city and 
municipal councils, they will now be directly elected. This system might serve to hold local 
government more accountable, while at the same time offering mayors more authority 
and political capital. 
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But the current moment provides an opportunity. The Copperbelt’s dependence on the 
mining sector has never reflected the best strategy in terms of job creation, since copper 
mining is a capital-intensive industry. Only 5.9 percent of the provincial labor force works in 
the mining sector,122 and while the copper industry does spur indirect job creation, it has 
largely failed to create a dynamic local economy with formal jobs. With the right mix of 
interventions, Zambian policymakers can reverse the Copperbelt’s economic downturn and 
at the same time create a vibrant urban labor market in the region through diversifying its 
economic output. 
 
The province has significant assets that can be built upon. For one, the Copperbelt is home to 
about a quarter of the country’s skilled labor.123 After Lusaka, the Copperbelt has the second 
largest number of training and vocational education institutions in Zambia.124 It has the 
largest number of institutes offering advanced certificate courses, in fields like Mechanical 
and Automotives, Commerce and Business, Information Technology and Electronics.  
 
And in terms of infrastructure, the province is well connected by road and rail to other 
important trade centers, both within Zambia and internationally. Projects like Link Zambia 
8000 and Lusaka-Copperbelt Corridor are leading to large-scale upgrading of various roads 
linking commercial centers like Ndola, Chingola, Mufulira, Chililabombwe. The impetus for 
such projects may be the mining industry, but other, more labor-intensive industries can 
benefit, too. The government is also expanding railways in the Copperbelt by both direct 
investment and through public-private partnerships. New lines are being built to connect 
Chingola to Lumwana, which will ease trade between the Copperbelt and the North-Western 
Province. The Northwest Rail Company has awarded a 590-kilometer line contract to link the 
Copperbelt to Angola.125,126  
 
Moreover, because of the mining sector’s historically voracious appetite for electricity, the 
Copperbelt is well placed on the Zambia National Grid. Despite the ongoing crisis with 
hydroelectric power, the Copperbelt hosts some of the few alternatives: the Ndola Energy 
Extension, a heavy fuel oil (HFO) plant, and a biomass plant operated by the Copperbelt 
Energy Corporation.127  
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Finally, the Copperbelt’s large swathes of uncultivated land and adequate rainfall leave much 
unrealized potential for its agriculture sector, which could form the backbone of a successful 
agro-processing industry based in its cities.  
 
Given these advantages, the Copperbelt can become a more competitive, job-creating urban 
region by developing the following sectors: agro-processing; building materials; copper 
product manufacturing; and gemstone processing. The depreciation of the Kwacha means 
that these industries could be successfully export-oriented, though firms will also have to 
grapple with higher prices for imported technology and intermediate goods.  
 
There is another important reason to focus on revitalizing the Copperbelt. The projections for 
Lusaka’s population growth, combined with the weak employment trends in its labor market, 
raise a red flag. These patterns spell a possibility of the labor market in Zambia’s capital 
becoming increasingly oversaturated, placing downward pressure on wages and working 
conditions, unless rural-urban migrants and other workers have alternative destinations. If 
revitalized, the Copperbelt’s cities – such as Chingola, Kitwe, Ndola – can relieve some of the 
stress on Lusaka by absorbing rural-urban migrants and other new entrants into the labor 
market. 
 
The following sectors represent opportunities for the Copperbelt to stimulate job creation 
and diversify its economy.128 
 
 Agro-processing: While the Copperbelt records high crop yields for maize, wheat, soy 
beans and rice, much of its arable land is not under cultivation. A Copperbelt-based 
agro-processing industry, then, could benefit dramatically from two different 
interventions: (1) stimulating the growth of commercial agriculture to bring more 
land under cultivation and increase yields of primary products, and (2) developing 
export-oriented processing industries around soy, corn and wheat.  
 
 Building Materials: Cement is one of most important building materials and the 
Copperbelt has the largest deposit of limestone in Zambia, a key input in cement 
production. With the construction industry one of Zambia’s fastest growing sectors – 
now comprising 14 percent of GDP – and the government’s massive commitments to 
housing construction and infrastructure projects, the Copperbelt has significant 
opportunity to expand its cement production. Moreover, some of the continent’s 
largest cement importers are adjacent to Zambia. The combined market for cement 
imports in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi and 
Mozambique is worth nearly US$ 600 million – and among these DRC is the only 
significant importer of Zambian cement today.129 The depreciation of the Kwacha 
gives Zambia a competitive advantage to expand cement exports to its neighbors. 
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 Copper Product Manufacturing: Copper is the primary input for many high-value-
added products – cathodes, copper wire, household appliances, and motor parts, to 
name a few – only a fraction of which the Copperbelt has developed the capacity to 
produce at scale. A new Multi-Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ) in Chambishi can be a 
central player in facilitating growth of both heavy and light industries. In order to 
ensure the MFEZ is part of a larger, job-creating value chain, policy interventions 
should seek to build industrial clusters and infrastructure that foster forward and 
backward linkages between economic activities within the MFEZ and those in nearby 
areas.   
 
 Gemstones Mining and Processing: Given the abundant supply of emeralds and other 
precious stones in the Copperbelt, the gemstones industry can create a substantial 
number of jobs. The new Sub-Sahara Gemstone Industrial Park is dedicated to 
gemstone processing, a labor-intensive industry projected to create 30,000 jobs in 
Ndola alone.130 But as observers have noted, the ability for this sector to generate 
employment also depends on whether local businesses are empowered to join the 
supply chains and produce higher-value-added gemstone products for export. Local 
manufacturers in the sector require affordable credit to invest in better technologies 
for extraction and finishing.  
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131 
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BOX 7 
Revitalize and diversify the Copperbelt to create a more dynamic, job-creating urban region  
 
Action Plan 
 
1. Partner with international donors to create a Copperbelt Urban Innovation Fund, 
where municipal bodies in the Copperbelt compete with each other in applying for 
funds to implement programs around job creation, skill development, and support 
for priority sectors. Convene a high-level committee of independent experts, central 
government officials, provincial government officials and participating donors to 
review applications for funds, monitor progress and extract key policy lessons for 
the province and country as a whole. Such a program would not only make available 
greater resources for municipal bodies; it would also encourage local authorities to 
engage more in the policymaking process and enhance their capacity to implement 
new ideas.  
2. Facilitate partnerships between multinationals seeking to invest and set up 
operations in Zambia and domestic firms involved in complementary activities in the 
Copperbelt131 – for example, international mining companies and local firms 
involved in copper product manufacturing. Create incentives for global firms to 
enter into these partnerships, through, for example, preferential tax rates.  
3. Launch a “Food Export Mission” in crops like soy, corn and wheat, headquartered in 
the Copperbelt, to identify the right markets, invest in market creation, and help 
small- and medium-sized enterprises meet international standards of quality. Create 
an export hub and demand servicing center for the agro-processing industry in the 
Copperbelt, where companies can procure, store, process and export from a single 
location.  
4. Leverage the continent-wide recognition of the Copperbelt as one of Africa’s first 
industrial regions to build a “Brand Copperbelt” centered on consumer products – 
including food and other agro-products and building materials like cement.  
o Create a province-wide quality assurance board that certifies Copperbelt-
made products as meeting international norms and offers those products a 
“Brand Copperbelt” label at no cost to the firm.  
o Invest in marketing efforts in priority export markets – such as South Africa 
and Tanzania – to build the reputation of “Brand Copperbelt.” 
5. Retrofit and/or expand existing Technical, Vocational and Educational Training 
(TVET) institutions to meet the demands of emerging sectors – agro-processing, 
gemstone mining, building materials, and copper product manufacturing. Encourage 
apprenticeship programs that place new trainees in small- and medium-sized 
domestic firms to improve labor market linkages and enhance the human capital of 
Zambian enterprises.  
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Conclusion: Placing employment at the center of Zambia’s urban strategy 
 
Zambian policymakers face many challenges as the country rushes headlong toward an 
uncertain urban future: an acute housing shortage, large proportions of the urban population 
still unserved by piped water and electricity, and a fiscal crunch that will put strain on 
municipal budgets – to name a few. Zambia must avoid the vicious cycle that emerges from 
poor public investment in cities, failure to leverage the built-in benefits of urban economies, 
and resource-strapped municipalities – a cycle that results in poor employment opportunities 
and outcomes for urban workers.  
 
It is critical that these challenges Zambian cities face are addressed with an integrated policy 
framework that seeks to leverage complementary objectives. Many of the proposals 
contained within this paper would serve multiple priorities within the urban agenda. Better 
public transit, for example, improves small enterprise efficiency and supports labor market 
matching, but it also addresses concerns about the growing carbon footprint of Zambian 
cities. This complementarity should enhance public support for the right interventions. 
 
Given the current situation – with eroding urban incomes, a decline in the share of formal 
jobs in non-farm sectors, and large increases in urban unpaid family workers – it is clear that 
urban employment needs renewed attention among Zambian policymakers. As leaders in the 
Ministry of Local Government and Housing and beyond consider various ways of improving 
the quality of urbanization in Zambia, they must make “job-rich” the lens through which each 
proposed initiative is evaluated. 
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